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(offering concessions) and negative
A content analysis system for measuring positive concessions (offering
offered concessions) was introduced and validated through an archival study of
concessions (rejecting offered
of
government-to-government documents from 4 crises, 2 of which escalated to war and 2 of which were
government-to-government
peacefully
documents, concession making was positively associated with
peacefully resolved. In the archival documents.
affiliation motivation and negatively associated with power motivation. A 2nd, laboratory experimental
affiliation
confirmed these relationships and demonstrated priming effects
effects of motive imagery and concession
study confirmed
making, in a received diplomatic letter, on participants' responses. Finally, the motive imagery and
concessions scores in participants' responses were related in predicted ways to their policy choices.

Not every conflict
conflict or crisis escalates to war. Even when there
may seem to be no way out, a way is sometimes found. For
example, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October
U.S. President John F. Kennedy estimated the chances of
of
1962, U.S.
nuclear war as "somewhere between one out of three and even"
(Sorenson, 1965, p. 705). Yet Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev
and Kennedy worked their way out of a nuclear box, each making
concessions while resisting the siren calls from some advisors to
& Naftali,
"stand firm" or even begin military action (Fursenko &
1997).
1997).
In March of that same year, French President Charles de Gaulle,
who had been brought to power in 1958 by a virtual military coup
franchise," success
in support of a continued colonialist "Algerie frant;:aise,"
fully negotiated Algerian independence. And 6 months later, on a
visit to France's ancient enemy Germany, de Gaulle several times
people," repeatedly ex
spoke, in German, of "the great German people,"
claiming, with his arms raised above his head, "Es lebe Deut
schland!" ["Long live Germany!"] (de Gaulle, 1970, pp. 6-9, 15;
see also La Couture, 1991,
1991, p. 341).
Finally, consider the annus mirabilis that began in February
1989. On the 6th of that month, the government of Poland re
frained from introducing martial law to suppress dissent (as it had
in December 1981) and instead began roundtable talks that led to
open elections. In October, the East German regime responded to
massive demonstrations in East Berlin and Dresden, not with force
and repression (as in 1953), but with discussions that began the
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process of peaceful
peaceful unification
unification of East and West Germany. In
November, the "velvet revolution" in Czechslovakia led to the end
of one-party rule and the promise of elections. And in February
African nationalist party leader Frederik de Klerk
1990, South African
African National Congress,
announced the "unbanning" of the African
released Nelson Mandela from prison, and took the first steps
toward negotiating a peaceful
peaceful transfer of power from the White
minority to the Black majority.
In 1979, Hans Morgenthau, the great scholar of international
confessed to a friend: "I am extremely pessimistic. In my
relations, confessed
opinion the world is moving ineluctably toward a third world
war—a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be
war-a
p. 73). Three months later,
done to prevent it" (Boyle, 1985, p.
George Kistiakowsky (a chemist and presidential science advisor
who helped to develop the atomic bomb) told a Harvard audience
of
that "I personally think that the likelihood for an initial use of
nuclear warheads
warheads is
is really
really quite
quite great
great between
now and
and the
the end
end of
nuclear
between now
of
this century"
century" (Boyle,
(Boyle, 1985,
1985, p.
73). Yet
Yet the
the millennium
millennium has
has come,
come,
this
p. 73).
and we
we are
are still
still here,
here, without
without the
the use
use (so
(so far)
far) of
of nuclear
nuclear warheads
warheads
and
or aa third
third world
world war.
war.
or

Concessions, Compromise, and the Resolution of
of Conflict
Conflict

of Concessions
The Necessity of
If
If wars are frequent and human beings are often violent toward
each other, it is also true that humans can (and often do) compro
conflict escalation and war. The essence of
of every
mise to avoid conflict
conflict is a clash of two or more incompatible desires, claims, or
conflict
principles: One party (person, group, or nation-state) wants,
claims, or supports something that is also wanted, claimed, or
opposed by another party. For conflicts to be resolved (at least in
the absence of some creative win-win option), therefore, one side
must make a concession, giving up some previously announced
claim (also called a conciliatory initiative; see Pruitt, 1998, p.
490). Concessions may be mutual. They may emerge from discus
sion and negotiation, the threat of force, or the suggestion of a third
party. They may be motivated by the highest ethical principles or

tear of consequences.
consequences. They may be
be disguised or "sweet
"sweet
driven by fear
ened" by
by processes of reframing, redefinition, or other creative
creative
ened"
& Ury,
Ury, 1991;
1991; Pruitt,
Pruitt,
negotiation and mediation techniques (Fisher &
1983; Rubin.
Rubin, 1981).
1981). In
In every case,
case, however, concessions are
are the
the
1983;
resolution.
fundamental building block of conflict resolution.
To be successful, of course, concessions must ultimately be
reciprocated. The course of negotiations, in international diplo
orchestra
macy as well as in the laboratory, usually involves the orchestra
threats,
tion of a complex combination of elements (demands, threats,
promises, concessions, and even third-party interventions) into
1987; also Carnevale &
& Pruitt,
overall strategies (see Patchen, 1987;
1992; Lebow, 1996,
1996, chapters 6-8; Pruitt, 1998;
1998; Rubin, 1994).
1992;
Still, one side usually has to take the first step.
step. Thus,
Thus, on Octo
ber
24,
1962,
Khrushchev
answered
Kennedy's
proclamation
of aa
ber 24, 1962. Khrushchev answered Kennedy's proclamation of
limited blockade
blockade with
with defiance:
defiance: "The
"The Soviet
Soviet government
government cannot
cannot
limited
instruct the
the captains
captains of
of Soviet
Soviet vessels
vessels bound
bound for
for Cuba
Cuba to
to observe
observe
instruct
the
instructions
of
American
naval
forces
blockading
that
island"
the instructions of American naval forces blockading that island"
(Fursenko
&
Naftali.
1997,
p.
256).
On
the
next
day,
however,
he
(Fursenko & Naftali. 1997, p. 256). On the next day, however, he
told the
the meeting
meeting of
of the
the Presidium
Presidium of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet Communist
Communist Party
Party
told
that he
he would
would order
order four
four ships
ships that
that were
were transporting
transporting missiles
missiles to
to
that
Cuba
to
turn
around
and
would
propose
the
removal
of
missiles
in
Cuba to turn around and would propose the removal of missiles in
exchange for
for an
an American
American pledge
pledge not
not to
to invade
invade Cuba-this
Cuba—this set
set in
in
exchange
motion the
the exchange
exchange of
of messages
messages between
between Khrushchev
Khrushchev and
and
motion
Kennedy that
that ultimately
ultimately shaped
shaped the
the resolution
resolution of
of the
the crisis.
crisis.
Kennedy
It is important to realize that concessions may not always be
appropriate, wise, or good in the retrospective view of history.
Thus, although most people would agree that the mutual conces
sions that resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis may have prevented a
thermonuclear holocaust, many would argue that the one-sided
concessions of the 1938 Munich agreement only postponed (and
may even have made more likely) the outbreak of World War II.

of Concessions
The Costs of
Concessions usually involve costs, both real and symbolic.
Although concessions may be appropriate under certain conditions
(Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 61-62; see also Jervis, 1976), an insatia
ble and powerful
powerful opponent may respond with further demands
instead of a reciprocal concession (Lebow, 1996, p. 78). Thus,
making a concession may not ultimately prevent a war. Over 2,000
years ago, the Roman lawyer and political leader Cicero (trans.
1953, p. 527) asked, "What can be done against force without
force?"'
power"
of the
the "ways
"ways of
of power"
force?'" Schmookler's
Schmookler's (1984)
(1984) analysis
analysis of
suggests
much."
suggests that
that the
the reply
reply should
should be,
be, "Not
"Not much."
In the minds of
of several generations of
of American leaders, the
apparent failure of
of the 1938 Munich and 1945 Yalta agreements
thoroughly discredited concessions and appeasement. As Clark
Clifford
Clifford (1946/1968) advised President Harry Truman in a 1946
memorandum that was to guide U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union in the late 1940s: "The language of
of military power is the
only language the disciples of
. . . . Compromise
of power understand
understand....
and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidence of
of
weakness and they're encouraged
encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new
and greater demands" (p. 477).
Concessions may be misinterpreted
misinterpreted as signs of
of weakness, capit
ulation, or collapse (Schelling, 1963, pp. 71,
111). For example,
71,111).
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when U.S. Secretary
Secretary of
of State
Dean Rusk learned that the ships had turned back from the block
ade line,
line. he exclaimed
exclaimed to National Security Advisor McGeorge

Bundy,
Bundy, "We
"We are
are eyeball to
to eyeball and the
the other fellow just
blinked!" (Rusk, 1990,
1990, p.
p. 237),
237), which seemed to
to frame Khrush
Khrush
chev's action in
in terms of the
the adolescent game of "chicken."
"chicken." At a
level, making concessions may suggest passivity
passivity
more symbolic level,
& Stephenson,
Stephenson, 1977,
1977, pp.
pp. 40-41, on
and low prestige (see Morley &
loss). Because power relations and gender are often taken as
image loss).
1986; see also Rank, 1914),
1914), many
metaphors for each other (Scott, 1986;
consciously)
male political leaders might even (albeit not always consciously)
view concessions as threats to their sexual orientation and gender
identity.
Finally, concessions may be impossible to sell to constituents
constituents
(Lebow, 1996,
1996, pp.
pp. 12,95,
12, 95, 104).
104). In fact, Khrushchev's concessions
concessions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis were one reason his opponents
opponents
his most severe
removed him from office two years later. As one of his
time, "We had to accept every demand and
critics claimed at that time,
U . S . . . . This incident damaged the in
condition dictated by the U.S....
ternational prestige of our government, our party, our armed
forces, while at the same time raising the authority of the United
& Naftali, 1997, p.
p. 354).
States" (Fursenko &
If we understood the psychological factors that led political
leaders to make concessions instead of escalations, we might be
able to encourage more felicitous outcomes like the examples
mentioned at the beginning. To that end, this article describes two
identify
studies, one archival and one laboratory, designed to identify
motivational factors associated with the choice of concession and
compromise, rather than escalation and aggression, in a conflict
conflict
situation. We also wanted to explore the relation between people's
offering of concessions.
images of concession and their actual offering

Psychological Research on Concessions
Concessions
Although the word concessions appears only three times in the
index of the most recent Handbook of
of Social Psychology (Gilbert,
& Lindzey, 1998) and not at all in either of the most recent
Fiske, &
handbooks of personality research, the topic of concession making
involves a wide variety of cognate concepts and literature, includ
ing, at the least, the following: bargaining, negotiation, decision
conflict resolution, power and dominance, aggression,
making, conflict
altruism, trust, deference, conformity
conformity and compliance, submission,
and appeasement. However, the core generalizations about the
antecedents of
of making versus withholding concessions are drawn
from the enormous literature on social conflict
conflict and negotiation.
Much of
of the review that follows is based on Carnevale and Pruitt
(1992), Druckman (1994, 1997), Pruitt (1998), Pruitt and Rubin
(1986), and Thompson (1990). (See Morley &
& Stephenson, 1977,
for
1998, and
of earlier
earlier work;
work; see
see Kriesberg,
Kriesberg, 1998,
and Kriesberg
Kriesberg &
&
for aa review
review of
Thorson,
1991,
for
reviews
that
draw
extensively
on
the
Thorson, 1991, for reviews that draw extensively on the history
history of
of
international
relations.)
international relations.)

Structural and Situational Factors
The likelihood
likelihood of
of one or both parties offering
offering concessions in a
conflict or negotiation situation is affected
affected by many structural and
conflict
of parties
situational factors, such as the following: the number of
framework (e.g., judi
(bilateral vs. multilateral); the institutional framework
'[ Cicero's letter, written in 44 B.C.E., was addressed to his ally Cassius
of Julius Caesar.
after the assassination
assassination of
during the hectic months after

vs. religious atonement); the site and physical setting of
cial vs.
of
negotiations (e.g., the "shape of the table" that was so controversial
in the Vietnam peace negotiations in the early 1970s); the agenda,
decision rules, and normative structure; the public visibility of the
negotiating parties (e.g., through presence of the media or other
audience); the existence of deadlines and time pressures; the
number and nature of issues under discussion; and the initial
positions of the parties and consequent distance between these
positions. More abstractly, the incentive structure (or "payoff
"payoff
matrix") represents the possible gains and losses to each party, as
a consequence of their combined decisions and responses.
responses.

Relational Factors
Most negotiating parties have a previous history of negotiating
with each other and with other parties; frequently this history is
said to furnish lessons or heuristics that are applied, rightly or
& May, 1986), to frame the
wrongly (Khong, 1992; Neustadt &
current negotiation. Depending on the interests of each side, it may
be easier or harder to discover (or construct) common overarching
interests that can help to bridge areas of disagreement. At any point
during the actual negotiations, the cumulative history of the current
process itself-the
itself—the complex and dynamic sequence of requests,
demands, threats, concessions, compromises, reciprocity (or its
lack)—exerts powerful
effects on
on the
the next
next steps
steps (Morley
(Morley &
& Ste
lack)-exerts
powerful effects
Ste
phenson,
1977, pp.
85-101). Thus,
Thus, we
we can
can speak
speak of
of ripeness
ripeness (when
(when
phenson, 1977,
pp. 85-101).
the "time
"time is
is ripe"
ripe" for
for intervention,
intervention, for
for making
making aa concession,
concession, for
for
the
compromise,
etc.;
see
Kriesberg
&
Thorson,
1991)
and
turning
compromise, etc.; see Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991) and turning
points
in the
the negotiation
negotiation process
(Druckman, 1997,
1997, p.
99; 2000).
process (Druckman,
p. 99;
2000).
points in

Individual Factors
differ in
Individual negotiating parties and individual persons differ
their willingness to make concessions. For example, the gender
affect how they negotiate.
and cultural backgrounds of negotiators affect
politics-that is, the perceived domestic social, eco
Bureaucratic politics—that
nomic, and political constituencies and support structures (and
ef
party-often exert substantial ef
opposition structures) of each party—often
fects on ostensibly external negotiations. And the kind of advance
preparation negotiators undertake (thinking about strategy vs. is
sues) affects
affects their subsequent level of compromise behavior. At
tributions, especially
especially about
about the
the situation
situation and
and traits
traits of
of the
the negotiat
negotiat
tributions,
ing counterpart,
counterpart, are
are also
also critically
critically important
important (Morris,
(Morris, Larrick,
Larrick, &
&
ing
Su, 1999).
Su,
1999).
Orientation.
Orientation. The meta-analysis of compromising behavior in
differ
negotiation by Druckman (1994) suggested that individual differ
vs. cooperative) is one of the
ences in orientation (competitive vs.
of
most powerful
powerful predictors of negotiation behavior. The concept of
psychological
psychological orientation was developed by Deutsch (1982), who
defined it as an amalgam of cognitive, motivational, and moral
elements. Thus a cooperative (vs. competitive) orientation would
include perception of the negotiation process as non-zero-sum (vs.
zero-sum), the other side as a partner (vs. opponent or enemy), and
the best outcome as maximum joint gain. It would include trust and
affiliation (vs. aggressive or dominance motives) and
the desire for affiliation
be grounded in an egalitarian (vs. exploitative) moral stance. In
most laboratory research, orientations are directly manipulated by
experimental instructions, although they are sometimes (e.g.,

difference
Druckman, 1967) measured as prior individual difference
variables.
Personality factors. Deutsch's (1982) use of a variety of dif
dif
difference constructs to define and describe co
ferent individual difference
operative and competitive orientations has certainly enriched their
connotative meaning. On the other hand, this inclusiveness has led
confusion and proliferation. Indeed, as
to a certain operational confusion
p. 192) noted, orientation is often measured by
Grzelak (1994, p.
outcome—a procedure that confuses independent and dependent
outcome-a
variables and invites circularity. It is useful, therefore, to review
the literature relating several specific personality variables, mea
sured by methods with established validity, that could plausibly be
considered as components of the cooperative versus competitive
orientation.2
orientation?
Personality traits are related to negotiating behavior, in real life
as well as in laboratory studies. Thus, in an archival study of
of
20th-century American presidents and secretaries of state, Ether
edge (1978) demonstrated that extraverts advocated force, whereas
introverts were inclined to promote compromise. Several cognitive
variables are related to cooperative behavior, especially in situa
& Dorsey, 1992; Winter,
tions of crisis and negotiation (see Voss &
1992). Archival studies by Suedfe1d
Suedfeld and his associates (Suedfeld &
&
& Thachuk,
Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1979; Wallace, Suedfeld, &
1993) demonstrated the connection between integrative complex
ity and peaceful
peaceful resolution of international crises. In contrast,
right-wing authoritarianism is associated with escalation in labo
ratory simulations (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 130-136).
Motives. Several different
Motives.
different kinds of studies have linked coop
eration and competition to one particular element of personality,
namely motives (particularly implicit motives; see McClelland,
& Weinberger, 1989). Implicit motives are measured
Koestner, &
through content analysis of verbal material, using the empirically
derived content-analysis scoring systems developed by McClel
land and his colleagues (see Winter, 1998; also Smith, 1992, for a
discussion of methodological and psychometric issues). For exam
ple, power motivation (a concern for impact, prestige, and repu
tation) is often associated with verbal and physical aggression (see
Winter, 1996, chapter 5) and an exploitative, aggressive negotia
& Kleinbeck, 1975; Terhune, 1968,
tion style (see Schnackers &
affiliation motivation (a concern for close,
1970). In contrast, affiliation
friendly relations
relations among
among people
people and
and groups)
groups) is
is often
often linked
linked to
to
friendly
cooperative
behavior,
at
least
under
"safe"
conditions.
Table 1I
cooperative behavior, at least under "safe" conditions. Table
provides
description of
of the
the content-analysis
content-analysis scoring
scoring and
and
provides aa brief
brief description
associated actions
actions and
and outcomes
outcomes for
for these
these two
two motives.
associated
motives.
affect concession making: directly, in terms
Motivation should affect
of leading people to make (or emit) concessions, and indirectly,
both by affecting
affecting people's perceptions, construals, and evaluations
of others' responses and finally by guiding their own responses to
these responses. Studies in which leaders' motives are measured at
a distance have shown that leaders scoring high in power motiva
2
2

Space does not pennit
permit a review of the age-old debate about the relative
importance of structural and situational versus individual factors in deter
(1969/1987,
mining political and social outcomes. Greenstein (1969/1
987, Chap. 2)
suggested that the personalities of individual actors do play an important
role in situations that are new or unstructured, are emotionally arousing,
and involve unclear expectations. All of these features are certainly char
conflict situations.
acteristic of most conflict

Table 1I
Behavior Correlates of
of the Affiliation and Power Motives
Motive characteristic

Affiliation
Affiliation motive

Power motive

Verbal images scored

Concern about establishing, maintaining,
or restoring friendly relations among
persons or groups

Actions

Cooperative and friendly when "safe";
defensive and even hostile under threat

Negotiating style

Cooperative when safe; defensive and
hostile under threat
Friends and similar others

Concern about having impact, control,
or influence on another person,
group, or the world at large by
forceful actions, controlling
strong forceful
or regulating others, trying to
influence or persuade, unsolicited
helping, or acquiring prestige
Depending on level of
of responsibility,
either successful
successful leadership and
high subordinates' morale or
profligate impulsivity
Exploitative, aggressive

Seeks help from

tion tend to be aggressive and involve their countries in war
archi
(Winter, 1980, 1992). Finally, in content-analysis studies of archi
val materials such as cultural documents and government mes
mes
sages, high levels of power motivation are associated with subse
subse
affiliation motivation are
quent war entry, whereas high levels of affiliation
often associated with avoidance of war or at least ending war
(Winter, 1993, 1997).
A laboratory study of conflict escalation by Peterson, Winter,
and Doty (1994) showed that when one side expressed higher
affiliation motive imagery (vs. lower power and
power and lower affiliation
affiliation motive imagery), the other side responded in kind
higher affiliation
(higher power and lower affiliation), as well as with higher levels
aggression.33
of aggression.
Overall, then, there is strong ground for believing that the
affiliation motive is at the core of the cooperative orientation and
affiliation
that, in negotiation situations, it should therefore be associated
with making concessions and accepting the concessions of others.
In contrast, the power motive should be an important component of
of
the competitive orientation and should be associated with resis
resis
tance to making concessions, or rejecting concessions made by the
other side. The research reported in this article was designed to
different ways: (a)
explore these general hypotheses in two very different
through content
content analysis
analysis of
of archival
archival data
data drawn
drawn from
from actual
actual dip
dip
through
lomatic
negotiations
and
(b)
through
a
laboratory
simulation
of
lomatic negotiations and (b) through a laboratory simulation of
negotiation during
during the
the Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis.
Crisis. We
We agree
agree with
with
negotiation
Grezelak's (1994,
(1994, p.
260) call
call for
for integration
integration of
of laboratory
laboratory re
Grezelak's
p. 260)
re
search
on
conflict
and
cooperation
orientations
with
field or
or archi
archi
search on conflict and cooperation orientations with field
val studies
studies of
of "real-life
"real-life phenomena,"
to demonstrate
demonstrate that
that our
our
phenomena," to
val
theoretical concepts
concepts and
and measures
measures are
are truly
truly relevant
relevant to
to social
social
theoretical
reality (see
(see also
also the
the earlier
earlier integrative
integrative review
review by
Patchen, 1987).
1987).
by Patchen,
reality
Thus,
we
proposed
to
relate
concession
making
to
the
affiliation
Thus, we proposed to relate concession making to the affiliation
and power
motives—measured in
in both
laboratory tests
tests and
and archi
archi
both laboratory
and
power motives-measured
val government
government documents
documents by
by the
the same
same content-analysis
content-analysis systems.
systems.
val
The concept of motive imagery, as used in this article, deserves
a brief conceptual discussion. We used scoring systems that were
developed in the tradition of personality research, where individual
Thematic Apperception Test protocols were content analyzed to
measure the motives of individual persons (see Winter, 1998).
When applied to speeches, diplomatic communications, and other
documents usually produced by collectivities, we cannot be sure
that we are measuring the motives of the persons whose name is

Political experts

signed to the documents. Rather, we may be measuring the mo
mo
tives of loosely defined leadership collectivities, or even other,
nonmotivational concepts (see Winter, 1993, p. 535, for a detailed
discussion). From an empirical perspective, the important question
is whether these scores predict the same kinds of actions and
outcomes as they do among individuals. In this article, therefore,
we used the theoretically agnostic terms motive imagery and
documents
motives and persons.
persons.
documents instead of motives

Study I:
1: Developing and Validating a
Concessions
Coding System for Concessions
What is a concession, and how can it be measured in both
archival and laboratory research? On the one hand, the diplomatic
opera
history literature contains many examples but few precise opera
tional definitions or procedures for quantification. On the other
seem
hand, laboratory researchers often measure concessions by seem
ingly superficial
superficial variables such as the giving or exchanging of
of
small sums of money or "points." Although these measures are
precise, they do not necessarily have anything to do with conces
conces
sions in the real world of international relations (or, for that matter,
even significant
significant interpersonal relationships). For the present re
re
search, therefore,
therefore, we
we decided
decided to
to construct
construct aa new
new measure
measure of
of
search,
concession making
making that
that could
could be
used in
in both
archival and
and labo
concession
be used
both archival
labo
ratory studies.
studies.
ratory

Measuring Concessions: A Grounded Theory Approach
On the basis of a review of the political and psychological
& Thorson, 1991,
1991, pp.
literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1967; Kriesberg &
docu
264-265), as well as intensive comparison of diplomatic docu
ments from a crisis that escalated to war and a similar crisis that
peacefully resolved, Langner (1997) first developed a system
was peacefully
for coding concessions on the basis of verbal content. The two
crises were the outbreak of war between the United States and
Mexico and the peaceful
peaceful settlement of
of the U.S.
U.S. dispute with Great
3
3 This result is consistent with the finding of Wrightsman, Baxter,
Nelson, and Bilsky (1972) that cooperation is more likely when the "other"
is portrayed as cooperative rather than competitive.

Britain about the Oregon boundary. Both were related to the
Manifest Destiny and territorial expansion to
American sense of Manifest
of
the Pacific Coast, both were handled by the administration of
President James K. Polk, and both occurred during 1845 and the
half of 1846 (see Winter, 1997).
first half
The concessions scoring system is organized in terms of four
positive categories and four parallel negative categories. The pos
itive categories all involve proposing or accepting concessions in
dispute:
a dispute:
1. Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitate
facilitate
I.
negotiation and peaceful
peaceful resolution of a crisis;
offers of mediation by some third party (cf.
(cf.
2. Suggestions or offers
Rubin, 1981);
3. Taking, or offering
offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation
(can be subdivided into unilateral and reciprocal de-escalation
acts); and
4. Accepting a concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the
other side.
The negative categories are parallel to the positive ones, but
conflict:
involve rejecting concessions or escalating conflict:
I.
1. Declining or rejecting a procedural proposal made by the
other side;
2. Refusing
Refusing a suggestion or offer
offer of mediation;
3. Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation
(can be subdivided into unilateral and reciprocal escalation); and
4. Rejecting a proposed concession (positive Category 3 above)
made by the other side.
Further definitions and examples of these categories are given in
Table 2. In applying the system, the sentence is the unit of scoring.
The eight categories are logically independent of each other, which

means that, in principle, each sentence could be scored for the
presence of any category or categories.

Cross-Validating
in Archival
CrossValidating the Concessions Measure in
Documents From Four Crises
The first study was designed for two purposes: (a) to establish
the real-world validity of the concessions scoring system and (b) to
affiliation and power-motive
explore the relationships between affiliation
imagery and concessions. To cross-validate the scoring system,
diplomatic documents and other written government-to-gov
ernment communications from two additional pairs of crises were
mixed together and blindly scored for concessions and motive
imagery. Each pair consisted of a peacefully
peacefully resolved crisis and a
similar crisis (involving approximately the same countries, during
the same
same historical
historical era)
era) that
that escalated
escalated to
to armed
armed conflict.
conflict. This
This
the
method has
has been
characterized by
George (1979)
(1979) as
as structured
by George
structured
method
been characterized
focused
comparison (or
(or disciplined
disciplined configurative),
configurative), which
which is
is aa type
type
focused comparison
of historically
historically grounded
grounded theory
theory development:
development: Comparable
Comparable individ
individ
of
ual
cases, with
with different
different outcomes,
outcomes, are
are described,
described, analyzed,
analyzed, and
and
ual cases,
explained
in
terms
of
theoretically
relevant
general
variables.
explained in terms of theoretically relevant general variables.
The first matched pair consisted of the 1938 crisis over German
peacefully
demands to annex parts of Czechoslovakia, which was peacefully
resolved at the Munich series of conferences among Germany,
Great Britain, France, and Italy that averted (perhaps unwisely, and
in any case only for a few months) war. It was paired with the 1939
crisis over German demands to annex Danzig and modify the
1, 1939,
German-Polish boundary. That crisis ended on September I,
with the outbreak of World War II, as Germany invaded Poland.
Both of these crises arose from German expansion and involved

Table 2
Coding System for
for Scoring Concessions
Category

Definition
Definition and example
Positive categories

1. Procedural
I.
2. Mediation
3. De-escalation

4. Accept

Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitate negotiation and peaceful
peaceful resolution of a crisis. Example:
"We are prepared to set one single date if that would facilitate the task."
Suggestions or offers
offers of mediation by some third party. Example: "If
"If desired, I am willing to arrange for the
representatives of a third party at the discussion."
Unilateral: Taking, or offering
offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, not contingent on response of other side.
Unilateral:
Example: "I am willing to eliminate harmful military expenditures and focus on maintaining peaceful
peaceful relations
between our countries."
Reciprocal: Taking, or offering
offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, contingent on response of other side.
specified weapons, we
Example: "I assure you that if you adhere to the tenets of our agreement, eliminating the specified
will not attack."
Accepting a concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I will agree to your public
declaration that you are not supplying weapons and will agree not to invade."
Negative categories

I.
1. Oppose procedural
2. Oppose mediation
3. Escalation

4. Reject

Declining or rejecting a procedural proposal (positive Category I1 above) made by the other side. Example: "Further
communication between our diplomats is proving unproductive at this point, and therefore our representatives will
be returning home."
Refusing a suggestion or offer
offer of mediation. Example: 'This
"This government is not willing to involve a third party in the
Refusing
current dispute."
Unilateral: Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, not contingent on response of other side.
Unilateral:
Example: "We are prepared to halt your military shipments and will do so by stopping and examining your ships."
Reciprocal: Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, contingent on response of other side.
Example: "If
"If you break our agreement of nonviolence, we will retaliate."
Rejecting a proposed concession (positive Category 3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I cannot accept your
promise of not supplying weapons and therefore will not guarantee anything."

Great Britain and Germany as major antagonists. The other
matched pair consisted of two crises over Cuba that involved the
United States and the former Soviet Union: the disastrous 1961
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, who were in fact
organized, financed, and directed by the United States (Fursenko
& Naftali, 1997), and the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in
&
which the United States and Soviet Union narrowly averted nu
clear war. Although the Bay of Pigs lasted for only a few days, it
was clearly a war, complete with bombing, aerial combat, and
intense ground fighting between the Cuban army and the
American-trained and American-supplied invaders.
The first hypothesis of the archival study is that the documents
from the two peacefully
peacefully resolved crises will score higher in total
and positive concessions and lower in negative concessions than
documents from the two war crises. The second hypothesis is that
across all documents, the number of positive concessions will be
positively correlated with affiliation
affiliation motivation and negatively
correlated with power motivation and that for negative conces
sions, these correlations will be reversed.

Method
Selection of
of documents. The first step we took was to establish precise
beginning and ending dates. On the basis of the discussion in Watt (1989),
the Munich crisis was considered to have begun on May 22, 1938, and
ended on September 29, 1938, whereas the Poland crisis began on
March 31, 1939 and ended on September 3, 1939. Dates for the Bay of Pigs
22-28, 1962) were
(April 6-22, 1961) and Cuban Missile Crisis (October 22-28,1962)
based on the dates of the first and last documents available for scoring. 44
official govemment
government public
For each crisis, all documents representing official
government-to-government communications were drawn
statements or government-to-government
from the collection of documents assembled by Winter (1997) from pub
lished archival sources (see Appendix A for a list of all documents). This
government-to-government communications for the
yielded 32 written government-to-government
U.S. Department of State,
Munich crisis and 16 for Poland (taken from U.S.
1949, and Woodward &
& Butler,
Butler. 1949-1954). For the two U.S.-Soviet
1949.
Cuba, the written government-to-government
government-to-government communi
crises involving Cuba.
cations (from U.S. Department of State, 1973) were supplemented by two
public statements by President John F. Kennedy (one speech and one press
conference transcript) and three official
official Soviet public statements, for a total
of seven
seven Bay
Bay of
of Pigs
Pigs documents
documents and
and 12
12 Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis
Crisis documents.
documents.
of
Within each
each of
of the
the paired
crises, the
the documents
documents used
used were
were comparable:
comparable:
paired crises.
Within
verbatim government-to-government
government-to-government communications
communications for
for Munich
Munich and
and Po
verbatim
Po
land and
and government-to-government
government-to-government communications
communications plus
state
land
plus public
public state
ments for
for the
the Bay
Bay of
of Pigs
Pigs and
and Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis.
Crisis.
ments

To the extent that we were able to match both the nature of the crises and
of documents scored within each pair, within-pair differences
differences can
the type of
effect) to the different
different outcomes-peace
outcomes—peace
be attributed (whether as cause or effect)
war—of the two crises.
or war-of
of documents. Documents from all four crises were mixed
Scoring of
together in random order and scored for concessions by two scorers who
had been trained by Carrie Langner. To avoid bias, scoring of concessions
was done by two scorers who were unaware of the purpose and hypotheses
of the research and who had little knowledge of the four specific crises. The
scorers were trained in the use of the scoring system by Langner.
On a portion of these documentary materials that had also been scored
by Langner.
Langner, these two scorers attained category agreement figures (see
1992, p.
of .75 and .63.
.63. Both scorers scored all
p. 529) with Langner of
Smith, 1992.
documents, resolving all disagreements after discussion. Because the doc
uments varied in length, the raw concessions scores for each document
were divided by the number of words and multiplied by 1,000
1,000 to give a
figure of concessions per 1,000 words. Finally, subtracting negative con
cessions from positive concessions scores gave a net concessions score.

These documents had previously been scored for affiliation
affiliation and power
powermotive imagery according to the integrated running-text scoring system
(Winter, 1991) as a part of Winter's (1997) study, by a trained scorer who
was blind to the hypotheses and the historical details of the crises and who
agreement a .85)
had previously demonstrated high reliability (category agreement""
on materials precoded by expert scorers. Scores for each motive were also
of images per 1,000
1,000 words. To avoid the theoretical
expressed in terms of
issue of whether impersonal documents or their collective authors can have
Winter, 1993), as well
motives or motivation (as individual persons do; see Winter.
of the motive imagery measures, we used the
as the conceptual status of
theoretically more neutral term motive imagery to refer to these scores.

Results
Results
Validity of
of the concessions measure. Descriptive statistics for
all variables, for each crisis, are presented in Table 3. Two-way
analyses of variance, with crisis outcome (war vs. peace) and crisis
era (1930s vs. 1960s) as main factors, were carried out on the
concessions scores. The results show only a trend in the predicted
direction for positive concessions, peacefully
peacefully resolved crises were
higher, F(l, 63) = 2.26, P
p == .138; but significant
significant predicted effects
effects
for negative concessions, war crises were higher, F(l, 63) == 10.05,
pP == .002; and
and net
net concessions, peace
peace crises
crises were
were higher,
higher, F(l,
5.65, p =
= .021. There was also a near-significant main effect
effect
63) =
= 5.65,p
concessions—the 1930s crises were higher, F(
F( 1,
for era on positive concessions-the
63) =
= 3.60,
3.60, p
p =
= .063.
.063. Only
Only one
one Outcome
Outcome X
X Era
Era interaction
interaction was
was of
63)
of
borderline
significance: The
The war-peace
war-peace difference
difference in
in negative
negative con
con
borderline significance:
cessions was
was greater
greater for
for the
the two
two 1930s
1930s crises
crises than
than for
for the
the two
two
cessions
crises of
of the
the 1960s,
1960s, F(l,
F(l, 63)
63) =
= 3.82,
3.82, pp =
= .055.
crises
.055.
Overall, then, the concessions scores differentiate
differentiate the war and
peace crises of both historical eras in the predicted ways. In one
sense, these initial results may seem obvious because, almost by
definition, peaceful
peaceful crisis resolution involves one or both sides
making positive concessions, and war results from negative con
cessions. The real point of this first study, however, was to
demonstrate the validity of the concessions scoring system on real
archival material drawn from major international crises.
The trend for documents from the two U.S.-Soviet crises of
of
1961-1962 to contain fewer positive concessions than the two
British-German crises from 1938-1939 may be due to many
factors: the much more protracted nature of the Munich and Poland
differences in the
crises compared with the two Cuban crises, differences
differences
nature and number of issues at stake, and the historical differences
in government-to-government
government-to-government communication technology and
style.
Motive imagery and concessions. Table 4 shows the relation
ship between motive imagery scores and both kinds of concessions
scores, across all 67 documents from the four crises. As shown in
affiliation motive imagery is positively
the top part of the table, affiliation
4
4 The first air strikes occurred on April 15. The actual invasion began on
effectively ended on April 19. Because of a paucity of official
official
April 17 and effectively
government-to-government documents, as well as public statements, it was
government-to-government
necessary to include documents through April 22, by which time Kennedy
was already commissioning an investigation of the failed operation (Korn
bluh, 1998, pp. 303-320). Because this study was designed not to predict
system,
the outbreak of war but rather to validate the concessions scoring system.
this should not be a problem. One would certainly predict that communi
cations during
during aa war
war itself,
itself, like
like communications
communications before
before the
the war,
war, contain
contain
cations
few positive
positive concessions.
concessions.
few

Table 33
for Concessions in
in Documents
Documents From
From Four
Four Crises
Crises
Descriptive Statistics for
Negative
concessions

Positive
concessions
Crisis

n

M

Munich (peace)
Poland (war)
Difference (peace - war)
war)
Difference

32
16

3.57
3.57
1.43
1.43
2.14
2.14

Net
Net
1
concessions'
concessions·

M

SD

M

SD

0.25
0.25
1.96
1.96
-1.71
-1.71

0.54
0.54
2.80
2.80

3.32
3.32
-0.53
-0.53
3.85
3.85

6.21
3.96
3.96

0.55
0.55
0.61
-0.06
-0.06

0.89
0.89
1.05
1.05

0.22
0.22
-0.56
-0.56
0.78
0.78

1.59
1.59
1.09
1.09

SD
SD
1930s crises
6.18
6.18
1.99
1.99

1960s crises
Cuban Missile Crisis (peace)
Bay of Pigs (war)
(war)
Bay
Difference (peace - war)
war)
Difference

12
77

0.77
0.77
0.05
0.05
0.72
0.72

0.97
0.97
0.12
0.12

a

Number of positive concessions categories scored minus number of negative concessions categories scored
per 1,000
1,000 words).
(each per

a

posItIve concessions and
and net
net concessions and
and
associated with positive
negatively associated with negative concessions (i.e., rejecting
the reverse
concessions), whereas power motive imagery shows the
pattern. Considering both motive imagery scores together yielded
high beta regression coefficients
coefficients for
for each of the two motives and
high multiple correlations for
two
for the
the combined effect
effect of the
the two
motives. As
the table, the
the overall
As shown in
in the
the lower parts of the
pattern is
is similar for
for both the
the peace and
and war
war crises. Further
the pattern of correlation and
and regression
analyses showed that the
coefficients is robust across the four individual crises, the countries
coefficients
issuing the
the documents, the
the outcome (war or
or peace), and
and the
the his
torical era.
era. These
These results
results linking
linking motive
motive imagery
imagery to
to concessions
concessions are
are
torical
consistent with
with previous
archival and
and laboratory
laboratory studies.
studies.
consistent
previous archival

kinds of examples (motive images are
are underlined, whereas pas
sages scored for
insmall
small capitals).
capitals).
for concessions are
are in
1. Sometimes, to
to be
be sure, motive images and positive or nega
tive concessions seem intrinsically connected, as
as in
in this threat by
by
President Kennedy (J. Kennedy, 1961) to
to Soviet Premier Khrush
chev during the April 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis:

Concessions and Motive Imagery: Separate Concepts or
or
Shared Method Variance?

Table 4
Correlations and Standardized Regression Coefficients of
of
in Crisis Documents
With Motive Imagery in
Concessions Scores With

Overall, these results from the archival study demonstrate that
the concessions measures show the predicted relationships both to
to motive imagery. However, because
actual crisis outcomes and to
motive imagery and concessions were scored from the same doc
uments, these latter results might arguably reflect shared method
(i.e., overlap of the two content analysis scoring systems)
variance (i.e.,
rather than actual relationships between two separate, independent
sets of concepts.
Several comments can be
be made in
in response to
to such aa concern.
First, the manifest contents of the two scoring systems are,
are, in
in fact,
fact,
very distinct (d.
(cf. Tables 1 and 2).
2). The actual scoring of documents
for concessions and motives was carried out by two scorers,
scorers, at two
different times;
times; each scorer was unaware of
of the scorings made by
by
different
the magnitudes of
of the
the correlations and
and re
re
the other. Moreover, the
gression coefficients reported in
in Table 3,
3, although highly signifi
signifi
cant, indicate that the two scoring systems are empirically distinct
are also
also conceptually
conceptually related.
related.
even if they are
A
A close analysis of
of the documents shows that specific positive
do
and negative concessions are phrased in
in aa variety of
of ways that do
not necessarily entail imagery of
of any particular motive (see also
Winter &
& Stewart, 1977,
1977, p.
p. 51).
51). To illustrate this point, we cite five
five

image] by
outside
In the event of any military intervention [Power image]
by outside
we will immediately HONOR
HONOR OUR
OUR OBLIGATIONS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER
UNDER THE
THE INTER
force we
INTER
A M E R I C A N SYSTEM
SYSTEM TO
TO PROTECT
PROTECT THIS
THIS HEMISPHERE
HEMISPHERE AGAINST
AGAINST EXTERNAL
AMERICAN

AGGRESSION. (Kennedy, 1961, p.
286) [negative concession: escala
p. 286)
AGGRESSION.
tion—reciprocal; would also be Power if this sentence had not already
tion-reciprocal;
been scored for
for Power motive imagery]

Correlation with
Affiliation
motivation
Crisis type and
and
concessions scores

r

Power
motivation
r

f3

-.22t
.07
.07
-.22t

.52***
--.52***
.25t
.55***
--.55***

-.23
-.00
-.00
-.22

--.56**
.56**
.16
--.57**
.57**

-.33
.19
-.32

-.38
.40t
-.50*

f3

(N == 67)
All crises (N
67)

Positive concessions
Negative concessions
Net concessions

.19
-.16
-.16
.23t

.50***
- ~.31
. 3 1 **
.55***

Peace: crises
crises (n
(n == 44)
Peace
44)

Positive concessions
Negative concessions
Net concessions

.18
-.16
-.16
.20

.54**
-.26
-.26
.56**

(n == 23)
War crises (n

Positive concessions
Negative concessions
Net concessions
t pp < .10.

-.05
-.27
.18

.13
-.46t
-A6t
.411
AI
t

** p < .01.
.01. ***
.05. **
*** P
p<
< .'001.
* pp << .05.
.001.

2. Often, however, positive or negative concessions occur with
out any
any motive imagery. Here are
are two
two examples from the
the diplo
matic messages exchanged by
by German Foreign Minister Ribben
trop and British Foreign Secretary Halifax during the 1938 Munich
crisis:
It goes without saying that WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO ENTER
about internal
internal military
military measures. (Woodward
(Woodward &
UPON ANY DISCUSSION about
&
Butler, 1949-1954,
1949-1954, Vol.
Vol. 2,
2, pp.
127-129) [Negative
[Negative concession:
concession: re
Butler.
pp. 127-129)
re
jecting
process]
jecting process]

His Majesty's
me
Majesty's Secretary
Secretary of State for
for Foreign
Foreign Affairs
Affairs has
has instructed
instructed me
t o TRANSMIT TO
TO THE
THE FUHRER AND
AND REICH CHANCELLOR THE
THE ENCLOSED
ENCLOSED
to
REPRESENTS A REASONABLE
REASONABLE SCHEME FOR
FOR THE
THE CESSION OF
PLAN WHICH REPRESENTS
OF
SUDETEN GERMAN
GERMAN AREA TO
TO GERMANY,
GERMANY, as accepted in principle by
THE SUDETEN
Czech Government.
Government. (U.S.
(U.S. Department
Department of
of State, 1949,
1949, pp.
986
pp. 986
the Czech
de-escalation—unilateral]
988) [Positive: de-escalation-unilateral]

is from
from
Another example of concessions without motive imagery is
to President Kennedy dur
Khrushchev's October 27, 1962, letter to
dur
the Cuban Missile Crisis:
ing the
I therefore make
make this
this proposal:
proposal: WE
WE ARE
ARE WILLING
WILLING TO
TO REMOVE
REMOVE FROM
THE MEANS WHICH YOU
YOU REGARD AS
AS OFFENSIVE. WE
W E ARE
ARE WILLING
CUBA THE
IN THE UNITED NATIONS.
NATIONS.
TO CARRY THIS OUT AND TO MAKE THIS PLEDGE IN
YOUR
REPRESENTATIVE WILL MAKE A
DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THAT
Y
OUR REPRESENTATIVE
A DECLARATION
FOR ITS
ITS PART, CONSIDERING
CONSIDERING THE
THE UNEASINESS AND
THE UNITED STATES, FOR
AND
OF THE
THE SOVIET STATE, WILL REMOVE ITS
ITS ANALOGOUS
ANALOGOUS MEANS
ANXIETY OF
FROM TURKEY. (U.S.
(U.S. Department
Department of
of State, 1973,
1973, p.
648) [Positive:
[Positive:
p. 648)
de-escalation—reciprocal]
de-escalation-reciprocal]

in the
the absence of
3. Conversely, many motive images occur in
of
positive or
or negative concessions, as
as in
in this passage from the
the same
Khrushchev letter:
I1 have
have already
already said
said that
that our
our people,
people, our
our Government,
Government, and
and II personally,
personally,
of the
the Council
Council of
of Ministers,
Ministers, are
are concerned
concerned solely
solely with
Chairman of
as Chairman
our country
country develop
develop [Achievement
[Achievement image] and
and occupy
occupy aa
having our
having
worthy place among all
all peoples
of the
the world [Power
[Power image] in
peoples of
in
worthy
economic competition,
competition, in
in the development
development of culture
culture and
and the arts, and
economic
raising the
the living standard
standard [Achievement
[Achievement image] of the people. This
in raising
the most noble and
and necessary
necessary field
field for
for competition,
competition, and
and both the
is the
the
victor and the vanquished
vanquished [Power
[Power image] will derive only benefit
from
victor
benefit from
increase in
in the
the means by which
which man
it, because
it
because it means peace and an increase
man
and finds enjoyment
enjoyment [Affiliation
[Affiliation image].
lives and
4. Sometimes, motive and concession occur in
in close proximity,
but the
the motive is
is an
an antecedent to
to the
the concession, as
as in
in another
to Ribbentrop during the
the Munich crisis:
message from Halifax to
Majesty's Government
Government are
are so
so greatly
greatly disturbed
disturbed by
the signs of
His Majesty's
by the
of
deterioration in
in the
the atmosphere
atmosphere [Affiliation
[Affiliation image-concern
image—concern at
at dis
dis
deterioration
ruption of a relationship]
relationship] surrounding
surrounding the
the negotiations
negotiations at
at Prague
Prague and
and
ruption
by the
the seriousness
seriousness of
of the
the consequences
consequences of
of any
any other
other than aa peaceful
peaceful
to APPROACH THE GERMAN GOVERN
solution that they feel compelled
compelled to
solution
AND TO
TO ASK
ASK FOR
FOR THEIR COOPERATION
COOPERATION in averting any such
MENT AND
calamitous termination
termination to
to the
the discussion.
discussion. (Woodward
(Woodward &
& Butler,
Butler,
calamitous
Vol. 2,2,pp.
pp.277-278)
277-278) [Positive
[Positive concession:
concession: process;
process;
1949-1954, Vol.
1949-1954,
Affiliation if
if this
this sentence
sentence had
had not
not already
already been
scored]
would also
also be
been scored]
would
be Affiliation

5,
5. Finally, statements scored for
for concessions
concessions can
can be
be embedded
embedded
different motive images, as
as in
in this German rejection
in aa series of different
at the
the beginning of World War
War II:
II:
of aa British ultimatum at

The German
German people, however,
however, above all
all do
do not
not intend
intend to
to allow
allow
by Poles
themselves
be ill-treated
to be
ill-treated by
Poles [Power
[Power imagery].
imagery]. The
TheGerman
German
themselves to
BY
Government therefore REJECT THE
THE ATTEMPTS TO
TO FORCE GERMANY,
GERMANY, BY
OF A DEMAND [Negative
[Negative concession:
concession: Rejecting
Rejecting aa previously
previously
MEANS OF
Power if previous
sentence had
had not
not
offered proposal;
would also be
offered
proposal; would
be Power
previous sentence
already been scored] having
having the character
character of an ultimatum,
ultimatum, to recall its
its
already
forces which are
are lined up for
for the defence
defence of the Reich, and thereby
thereby to
forces
accept the old unrest
unrest and
and the old injustice,
injustice. The
The threat
threat that, failing
failing this,
accept
in the war [Power
[Power image], corresponds
corresponds to
to the
the
fight Germany
Germany in
they will fight
intention proclaimed
for years past by
numerous British
British politicians.
politicians.
intention
proclaimed for
by numerous
and the
the German
German people
had assured
assured the
German Government
Government and
The German
people had
the
English people
countless times how
how much they desire an
an understand
understand
English
people countless
the
indeed close friendship,
friendship, with them [Affiliation
[Affiliation image]. If the
ing, indeed
British Government
Government hitherto
hitherto always
always refused
refused these
these offers
offers and
and now
now
British
answers them
them with
with an
an open
open threat
threat of
of war
war [Power
[Power image],
image], it
it is
is not
not the
the
answers
fault of
of the
the German
German people.
(Woodward and
and Butler,
Butler, 1949-1954,
1949-1954,
people. (Woodward
fault
7, pp.
539-541)
Vol. 7,
Vol.
pp. 539-541)
On the
the basis of
of all
all these considerations, therefore, we
we believe
that the
are
the concessions and
and motive imagery scoring systems are
and that their empirical relationship is
is not
not
conceptually distinct and
an artifact
artifact of shared method variance (Le"
(i.e., content overlap
simply an
the two
two systems).
of the

Sequential Pattern of Concessions in
in Crises
The Munich and Poland crises showed interesting differences
differences in
the sequential pattern of
of positive and
and negative concessions cate
are hardly aa representative sample of
of all
all
gories, although they are
crises. (The two Cuban-related crises were too brief
brief to permit any
any
sequential analysis.) During the peacefully
peacefully resolved Munich crisis,
procedural categories scored very high in
in the
the middle and
and toward
the end, preceded in
in both cases by
by mention of mediation. Most of
of
the de-escalation
de-escalation responses
responses occurred
occurred only
only at
at the
the end.
end. In
In the
the Poland
Poland
the
crisis, which
which escalated
escalated to
to war,
war, procedural
responses were
were lower
lower
crisis,
procedural responses
overall but
distributed through
through the
the early
early and
and middle
middle stages
stages of
of the
the
overall
but distributed
crisis. De-escalation
De-escalation responses
responses occurred
occurred only
only during
during the
the middle
middle
crisis.
stages, whereas
whereas escalation
escalation as
as high
high both
at the
the beginning
and end
end of
stages,
both at
beginning and
of
the crisis.
crisis. Further
Further archival
archival and
and experimental
experimental studies
studies could
could deter
deter
the
mine whether
whether these
these contrasting
contrasting patterns
were typical
typical of
of peacefully
peacefully
mine
patterns were
resolved
and
escalating
crises.
resolved and escalating crises.

2: Experimental Study of the Antecedents and
Study 2:
Associated
Associated Behaviors of Concessions
the second study, we
we designed aa laboratory experiment to
In the
to
the situational antecedents of
of concessions, as
as well as
as the
the
explore the
are made in
in verbal exchanges to
relationship of concessions that are
to
as people's policy
other important associated behaviors, such as
choices and
and their
their implicit
implicit images
images about
about the
the negotiation
negotiation process.
process.
choices
The experimental
experimental procedure
recapitulated, in
in aa laboratory
laboratory setting,
setting,
The
procedure recapitulated,
some of
of the
the important
important elements
elements of
of the
the Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis.
Crisis.
some
Participants were
were first
first given
given different
different forms
forms of
of aa letter
letter from
from Soviet
Soviet
Participants
S. Khrushchev to
to U.S.
U.S. President
President John
John F.
F. Kennedy.
Kennedy.
Premier Nikita
Nilcita S.
After reading Khrushchev's letter, participants were asked to
to pre
pre
After
pare aa draft
draft response for
for Kennedy's
Kennedy's signature.
signature. These
These responses
responses
for concessions and for
for power and
and affiliation
affiliation motiva
motiva
were scored for
to evaluate specific options for
tion. Then, participants were asked to
and to
to respond to
to several questions.
United States action and
By varying certain features of
of the
the Khrushchev letter, it
it was
was
possible to
to determine the
the antecedents of
of (a)
(a) the
the level of
of couces
conces

I.
1. Ignore Khrushchev; bomb the missile bases and launch a full-scale
full-scale
offensive weapons and overthrow the
U.S. invasion to remove all offensive
Castro regime.
2. Ignore Khrushchev, and bomb the missile bases.
U.S. blockade to include oil.
3. Ignore Khrushchev, and tighten the U.S.
U.S. blockade as it
it is, and wait.
4. Ignore Khrushchev; leave the U.S.
but offer
5. Leave the
the U.S.
U.S. blockade as
as it
it is,
is, but
offer to
to negotiate with
of his
his proposals.
proposals.
Khrushchev on the basis of
6. Call off
off the blockade, and offer
offer to negotiate with Khrushchev on
of his proposals.
the basis of
off the
the blockade.
blockade.
7. Accept his proposals as they stand, and call off

in participants' responses, (b) the motive imagery levels in
sions in
in
participants' responses, and (c) the aggressiveness of
of their action
choices.

Method
Participants. Participants consisted of
of 118 students (61
(61 women, 56
56
introduc
men, and I1 who did not report gender) who were enrolled in an introduc
tory psychology class at
at the
the University
University of
ofMichigan.
Michigan.They
They participated
participated to
to
fulfill a course research participation requirement. Participants were tested
fulfill
in small groups of
of 20
20 to
to 30
30 people by
the first
first author. Average age
by the
age
= 0.88). Fifty percent were first-year students, 35%
was 18.71 years (SD =
were sophomores, and
and 15%
15% were more advanced students. Sixty-four
Sixty-four
percent were Caucasian, II
11% Asian American, 8% African
African American, and
17% "other" or
or not indicated.
Procedure. The basic procedure used in
in Study 22 was adapted from aa
et al. (1994, Study I).
1). Participants were instructed as
study by
by Peterson et
as
follows:
brief summary of an
In this experiment, you are first asked to read aa brief
crisis—the Cuban Missile Crisis of
of October 1962—
international crisis-the
1962
along with some historical materials from that crisis. After reading
this material, you will be asked to write aa response on the notepaper
[provided]. . . . After you have finished writing your response, please
[provided)....
complete the additional questionnaires.
Participants were then given aa one-page "Historical Background to
to the
the
of October 1962." Then, they read an
an abbreviated
Cuban Missile Crisis of
of the
the letter
letter written
written by
by Soviet
Soviet Premier
Premier Nikita
Nikita Khrushchev
Khrushchev to
to U.S.
U.S.
version of
President John F. Kennedy on October 26, at the climax of the crisis. In this
letter, Khrushchev reviewed the actions and perceptions of
of each side and
following:
then cautioned the following:
Mr. President, you and II should not now pull on the ends of the rope
of war, because the harder you and II
in which you have tied aa knot of
pull, the tighter this knot will become. And aa time may come when
this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable
of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would
not explain
explain totoyou,
you, because
because you
you yourself
yourself understand
understand
mean II need not
perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.

Two summary scores were calculated from the overall pattern of
partici
of partici
pants' policy choices. Because the
the seven items, arranged in
in the
the above
order, form an approximate Thurstone scale, 5 itit was possible to calculate
an "overall peacefulness
peacefulness of policy choices" score by multiplying ratings of
of
the seven responses by -3,
- 3 , -2,
- 2 , -1,0,
- 1 , 0 , 1,2,
1,2, and 3, respectively, and then
& Chave, 1929, p.
calculating the mean (Thurstone &
p. 64). However, from
both theoretical and practical points of
of view, another important summary
measure is participants' average endorsement of Policy Choices 5, 6, and 7,
all of which involve negotiation and, thus, de-escalation. This is described
of negotiation choices."
as the "average endorsement of
differential methods (Osgood, Suci, &
& Tannenbaum,
Using semantic differential
13 seven-point
1957), participants then rated the following five concepts on 13
bipolar adjective scales: NIKITA
F. KENNEDY, YOUR
NU(ITA KHRUSHCHEV, JOHN F.
AN IDEAL LEADER, and COMPROMISE.
COMPROMISE.66
REPLY TO KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER, AN
According to
to semantic differential
differential theory, these adjective scales yield
scores for the three major dimensions of connotative meaning: evaluation
(good-bad), potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). Finally,
in college, and (on
participants were asked their gender, ethnicity, year in
9-point scales) "How interested in
in international relations are you?" (an
(an
of I1 [extremely
disinterested] to
to 99 [extremely
choring points of
[extremely disinterested)
[extremely interested])
interested)
and "Before
"Before this
experiment, how
how familiar
familiar were
were you
you with
with the
the Cuban
Cuban
and
this experiment,
Missile Crisis?"
Crisis?" (anchoring
(anchoring points
of 11 [extremely
unfamiliar] to
to 99 [ex
[extremely unfamiliar)
[ex
Missile
points of
tremely familiar]).
The experimenter
experimenter also
also noted
noted the
the time
time of
of day
day of
of each
each
tremely
familiar D. The
experimental session.
session.
experimental

pro
Calling on
on each side to
to show "statesmanlike wisdom," Khrushchev pro
posed the compromise that became the basis for the ultimate settlement of
of
U.S. Department of
the crisis (The complete original letter is reproduced in U.S.
of
1973; the basic version used in the present study is from Peterson et
State, 1973;
al., 1994, pp. 742-744.)
a!.,
After
After reading the letter, participants were asked to perform the following
following
task:

Khrushchev letter versions.
The abbreviated
abbreviated Khrushchev
Khrushchev letter
letter had
had
versions. The
been previously been coded for
for power and affiliation
affiliation motivation by
an
by an
expert scorer, according to
to Winter's (1991) manual (see Peterson et
et al.,
a!.,
present study, four different
different versions of
of this abbreviated
1994). For the Present
letter were created, involving different
different combinations of
of motivation and
of the
the Khrushchev
Khrushchev
concession. Appendix B presents these four variations of
letter. In two versions of the letter (the power motivation conditions), all 9
affiliation imagery were removed and all 14 sentences with
sentences with affiliation
power motive imagery were retained. In
In the
the other two
two versions (the
(the
affiliation motivation conditions), the 14 power images were removed and
affiliation
the 99 affiliation
affiliation images
images retained.
retained. These
These two
two motivation
motivation conditions
conditions were
were
the
crossed by
two concession
concession conditions.
conditions. In
In the
the "explicit
"explicit concession"
concession" condi
condi
crossed
by two
tions, Khrushchev's
Khrushchev's compromise
compromise offer
offer was
explicitly quoted,
quoted, as
as follows:
follows:
tions,
was explicitly

Imagine that you are really in the middle of a major historical crisis.
Please imagine that you are an
an advisor to
to President Kennedy. The
letter you have read has just come in and the President has asked you
to draft aa reply to send to Khrushchev.

I propose: We, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba
not carrying
carrying any
any armaments.
armaments. You
You will
will declare
declare that
that the
the United
United
are not
States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any
other forces which might intend to invade Cuba.

Participants were given a sheet of lined paper, headed "The White House,"
of October 27, 1962, and an
an inside address to
to "Chairman
with the date of
Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R." entered at the top
F. Kennedy, Presiderit
President of
of the United States" at
at the
the bottom.
and "John F.
Participants were allowed about 20 min to write their responses.
After finishing their draft response letters, participants were asked to
to
for dealing with the crisis by
indicate their preferred
preferred policies for
by indicating
(stronglydo
donot
not
their agreement (on a 9-point Likert scale, ranging from I1 (strongly
favor) to 9 (strongly favor),
U.S. actions
favor), with the following seven possible U.S.
et aI.,
al., 1994):
(taken from Peterson et

(In terms of the concessions scoring system introduced in this article, this
passage would be scored for positive concession Category 3, "De-escala
"De-escala

5

That is,
is, the correlations of
of each
each item
item with
with adjacent
adjacent items
items are
are positive
positive
and higher than the correlations with all other items.
6
6 The following 7-point adjective scales were used, in this order: strong
strong
weak, peaceful-ferocious,
peaceful-ferocious, fast-slow, bad-good, small-large, static
static
unfair-fair, dis
dynamic, cruel-kind, sharp-dull, unpleasant-pleasant, unfair-fair,
dis
honest-honest, brave-cowardly, passive-active, and gentle-violent.
5

Table 5
Correlations of
of Concessions Measures With
With Policy Choices
Correlation with

Agreement with policy choice
Escalation responses
Bomb missile bases and
and invade Cuba
Bomb missile bases
to include oil
Tighten blockade to
oil
Neutral response
Keep blockade and
and wait
Negotiation responses
Keep blockade and
and offer
offer to
to negotiate
End blockade and
and offer
offer to
to negotiate
End blockade and
and accept Khrushchev's offer
offer
Summary measures
Overall peacefulness
peacefulness of policy choices
Average endorsement of negotiation choices

tp<.IO.
tp<.10.

*p<.05.
*p<.05.

**p<.OI.
**/»<.01.

Positive
concessions

Negative
concessions

Net
concessions

-.08
-.09
-.09
-.25**

.03
.13
.21*

-.07
-.14
-.14
-.30***

-.II
-.11

.01
.01

-.08

.18t
.18t
.19*
.25**

-.33***
-.09
-.09
-.18*
-.18*

.34***
.18t
.18t
.28**

.24**
.27**

-.20*
-.27**

.28**
.35***

***p<.OOI.
***/>< .001.

In contrast, the
the no-concession conditions omitted this
tion: Reciprocal"). In
passage, which left the
the excerpt of Khrushchev's letter containing only
for "statesmanlike wisdom." Some
threats, warnings, and a nonspecific call for
for example, a letter with many
of these versions might seem incongruous: for
power images that offered
offered a concession, or a letter full of affiliation
affiliation
imagery without an
an explicit concession. However, we believe that each of
of
as a single, free-standing communication.
the four versions was plausible as
(Readers can
can form their own judgment on
on this point by
Appen
by consulting Appen
dix B.)
dix
B.)
The four different
different versions of the
the abbreviated Khrushchev letter were
the versions in
in random order, thus
by stacking the
randomly mixed together by
for analyzing the
the effects
effects of the motive
creating a 2 x 2 factorial design for
(affiliation vs. power) and
and concession
concession (explicit
(explicit concession
concession vs.
vs. no
no
imagery (affiliation
in Khrushchev's letter on several variables: (a) the concessions
concession) in
in the responses participants drafted
drafted for
for the president,
and motive imagery in
(b) participants' policy choices, and
and (c)
(c) participants' implicit images of
of
the negotiation process. All
All four conditions (i.e.,
various aspects of the
Khrushchev letter versions) thus occurred in
in each of the
the experimental
sessions.
sessions.
Scoring of
of response letters.
letters. All response letters were scored for motive
an expert scorer, who
who had
had previously demonstrated high
imagery by
by an
.85) on
on materials precoded by
reliability (category agreement 2a .85)
by expert
to the
the
scorers. Concessions were scored by
by the first author, who was blind to
information about the participants and
experimental condition and all other information
in the usual way, as
as images
their responses. Motive scores were expressed in
per 1,000
1,000 words. The
The brevity of the
the response letters (range == 27-229
= 129 words), however, meant that most concession catego
catego
words, Mdn =
ries were scored only once if at
at all.
all. (Ninety eight percent of all
all positive
and 93%
93% of all
all negative concessions scores were
concessions scores and
1.) Adjusting raw scores for
for length, as
as was done with the much
either 0 or I.)
in Study I,
1, would actually introduce
longer diplomatic documents used in
For purposes of the
the present study, the
the important
substantial distortion. For
point was
was whether, in
in response to
to different
different versions of the
the Khrushchev
the letters contained any
any concession; therefore, concession scores
letter, the
not adjusted
adjusted for
for length of response.
response.77 The
The Pearson correlations with
were not
the point-biserial correlations that
these measures, therefore, approach the
would be
the collapsed presence/absence scores.
be obtained by
by using the
in
Plan of analysis and hypotheses. Study 2 was
was designed to
to explore, in
an experimental setting, the
of
the antecedents and
and associated consequences of
making concessions (i.e., of the concessions scores in
in participants' letters).
We were interested in
in three basic questions: (a)
(a) Would the
the relationships,

observed in the archival study, between affiliation
affiliation motivation and positive
and power
power motivation
motivation and
andnegative
negative concessions,
concessions, replicate
replicate at
at
concessions, and
To answer this question, we
we correlated the
the motive
the individual level? To
letters, (b) What
scores and the concessions scores in participants' response letters.
variables in the negotiation process might induce concessions? We hypoth
hypoth
the presence of an
an explicit (positive) concession in
in Khrush
Khrush
esized that the
chev's letter would cause participants to
to reciprocate with an
an explicit
positive concession in their response. Further, we
we expected that the
the affil
affil
iation motivation
motivation version
version of
of the
the Khrushchev
Khrushchev letter
letter would
would .be
be more
more likely
likely to
iation
to
elicit concessions
concessions in
in participants'
responses, (c)
(c) Finally,
Finally, we
we were
were interested
interested
elicit
participants' responses.
in exploring
exploring the
the relationship
among both
concessions and
and motivation
in
relationship among
both concessions
motivation in
in
participants'
response
letters
and
their
explicit
policy
choices,
as well
well as
as the
the
participants' response letters and their explicit policy choices, as
connotative meanings
meanings reflected
reflected in
in their
their images
images of
of the
the major
major actors
actors in
in the
the
connotative
crisis
(Kennedy,
Khrushchev),
the
concept
of
ideal
leader,
their
own
crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev), the concept of ideal leader, their own
responses, and
and the
the concept
concept of
of concessions.
concessions.
responses,

Results
Results
of the concessions measures. The first task was to
Validation of
extend the validity of the concessions measures, established by the
archival research of Study 1, to the present experimental study. In
other words, did those people who wrote responses to Khrushchev
that scored higher in concessions also choose less aggressive
policies? Table 5 presents the relationships between positive and
different policy
negative concessions and endorsements of different
policy options.
In general,
general, people
scoring high
high in
in positive
concessions and
and net
net
In
people scoring
positive concessions
concessions
tended
to
endorse
specific
policy
choices
that
in
concessions tended to endorse specific policy choices that in
volved negotiation
negotiation rather
rather than
than escalation
escalation and
and score
score higher
higher on
on both
both
volved
the "overall
"overall peaceable"
peaceable" and
and the
the negotiation
negotiation summary
summary scores.
scores. Peo
the
Peo
ple scoring
scoring high
high in
in negative
negative concessions,
concessions, in
in contrast,
contrast, tended
tended to
ple
to
endorse at
at least
least moderate
moderate escalation
escalation (tightening
(tightening the
the blockade
blockade to
to
endorse
include oil,
oil, higher
higher overall
overall aggressiveness
aggressiveness of
of policy
choices) rather
rather
include
policy choices)
than any
any kind
kind of
of negotiation.
negotiation. Thus
Thus the
the content
content of
of students'
students' open
open
than

7
the pOSitive
positive and
and negative concessions scores to
to simple
7 Collapsing the
presence-absence measures produced essentially the same results. For ease
of presentation, however, we
we present the
the results using continuous scores.

Table 66
Table
Descriptive Statistics
Statistics From
From Experimental
Experimental Study
Study of
of Concessions
Concessions
Descriptive
Summary
Summary policy
policy choices
choices

Response
Response to
to Khrushchev
Khrushchev letter
letter

Positive
Positive
concessions
concessions
Experimental condition
condition
Experimental
Affiliation, explicit
explicit
Affiliation,
concession (n
(n =
= 30)
30)
concession
Affiliation, no concessions
Affiliation,
(n =
= 30)
(«
explicit concessions
Power, explicit
(n =
= 28)
28)
(n
Power, no concessions
(n == 30)
conditions combined
combined
All conditions
(N == 117)

Negative
Negative
concessions
concessions

Net
Net
concessions
concessions

Affiliation
Affiliation
motivation
motivation

Power
Power
motivation
motivation

Overall
Overall
peacefulness
peacefulness

Negotiation
Negotiation
choices
choices

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

M
M

SD
SD

0.47
0.47

0.51
0.51

0.30
0.30

0.47
0.47

0.17
0.17

0.75
0.75

7.23
7.23

8.00
8.00

14.61

9.23
9.23

1.40
1.40

18.83
18.83

4.42
4.42

1.56
1.56

0.28

0.45

0.38

0.47

-0.10
-0.10

0.77

6.75

8.86
8.86

14.10

10.00

1.14
1.14

16.26

3.99
3.99

1.57

0.54
0.54

0.64
0.64

0.46
0.46

0.64
0.64

0.07

0.94
0.94

2.50

5.81

22.35

18.98

6.07
6.07

16.09

4.91

1.37

0.23

0.43

0.60
0.60

0.77

-0.37
-0.37

0.96
0.96

2.85

4.81

22.01

12.13 -0.13
-0.13

16.63

4.21

1.52

0.38

0.52

0.44

0.62

-0.06
-0.06

0.87

4.85

7.30

18.24

13.47

16.95

4.38

1.53

negotiatIOn responses was related to their actual policy
ended negotiation
choices.
Motives and concessions. In participants' response letters, mo
tive imagery scores were related to concessions in the same ways
I: Affiliation
Affiliation motive imagery was positively related to
as in Study 1:
positive concessions (r = .22, N = 118, pP < .05) and negatively
related to negative concessions (r = —.28,
-.28, p < .01), whereas
power motive imagery was negatively related to positive conces
.16, p
P < .10) and positively related to negative
sions (r == -—.16,
8
.001).8
concessions (r = .37, p < .001).
Effects of
of experimental conditions on concessions and motiva
tion expressed in participants'
participants' responses.
responses. A preliminary analysis
showed no pattern of significant
significant relationships among the depen
dent variables and the demographic variables (ethnicity, year in
college), interest in international relations, or previous knowledge
Crisis.99 (The effects of gender will be
of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
discussed below.) Table 6, therefore, presents descriptive statistics
on the major variables of Study 2 for each of the four separate
experimental conditions defined by the four versions of the
as for the entire combined sample.
sample.
Khrushchev letter as well as
The effects of the experimental conditions were tested with
three-way analyses of variance for the dependent variables based
on participants' responses to Khrushchev and their policy choices,
with the Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (variables of
affiliation versus power motivation) and
explicit concession and affiliation
as main effects. Whether the
the Khrushchev
Khrushchev
participants' gender as
an explicit concession had aa main effect
effect on
letter contained an
in their response offered aa positive conces
conces
whether participants in
sion, F(l, 109)
109) = 7.17,
7.17, P
p = .009,
.009, and offered more net conces
conces
sion,
sions, F(l, 109)
109) = 4.25,
4.25, P
p = .042,
.042, though it was
was unrelated to
to
sions,
participants' negative concessions.
concessions. The same
same reciprocal pattern
pattern
participants'
was observed
observed for
for the
the motive
motive imagery
imagery content
content of
of the
the Khrushchev
Khrushchev
was
letter. Participants
Participants receiving
receiving the
the affiliation
affiliation version
version responded
responded with
with
letter.
higher affiliation,
affiliation, F(l,
F(l, 109)
109) == 12.24,
12.24, p << .001,
.001, and
and lower
lower power,
power,
higher
F(l,
109) == 10.54,
10.54, Pp == .002,
.002, than
than did
did those
those receiving
receiving the
the power
power
F(
I, 109)
version. (That
(That power
power was
was greater
greater than
than affiliation
affiliation in
in all
all conditions
conditions
version.
was probably
probably due
due to
to the
the "pulling
"pulling power"
power" or
or motive-arousal
motive-arousal effects
effects
was
of the
the experimental
experimental situation.)
situation.) There
There was
was aa near-significant
near-significant trend
trend
of
for the
the Khrushchev
Khrushchev letter
letter version
version that
that offered
offered an
an explicit
explicit conces
conces
for
sion to
to elicit
elicit aa higher
higher average
average endorsement
endorsement of
of negotiation
negotiation choices,
choices,
sion

2.06

F(l, 109) = 3.08, p = .082. There were no significant
significant interactions
of
of the two Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (Motivation
Condition X
X Concession Condition).
Gender showed only three significant
near-significant main
significant or near-significant
effects: For positive concessions, women were higher, F(l,
109) =
= 3.76, p == .055; for peacefulness
peacefulness of
of policy choices, women
scored higher, F(l,
F(I, 109) =
= 2.97, p
P = .087; and for negotiation
policy choices, women scored higher, F(l, 109) =
= 4.72, p =
= .032.
effects are consistent with other evidence showing that,
These effects
under some circumstances at least, women tend to show lower
levels of certain kinds of aggressive behaviors than do men (Geen,
differences in either
1998, pp. 330-332). There were no gender differences
significant two-way inter
motive imagery score. There was one significant
action involving
involving gender:
gender: women
women responded
responded with
with higher
higher power
power
action
motive imagery
imagery (though
(though not
not more
more aggressive
aggressive responses)
responses) when
when
motive
Khrushchev's letter
letter included
included an
an explicit
explicit concession,
concession, whereas
whereas men
men
Khrushchev's
showed
the
opposite
pattern,
F(l,
109)
=
8.00,
p
=
.006.
Perhaps
showed the opposite pattern, F(l, 109) = 8.00, p = .006. Perhaps
in aa simulated
simulated international
international conflict
conflict (until
(until recently,
recently, at
at least,
least, aa
in
stereotypically male
male situation),
situation), these
these women
women felt
felt pressure
pressure to
to em
em
stereotypically
bellish their
their response
response to
to aa "dove"
"dove" (Khrushchev's
(Khrushchev's concession)
concession) with
with
bellish
their own
own imagery
imagery of
of the
the "hawk"
"hawk" (power
(power motive).
motive). Finally,
Finally, there
there
their
was one
one near-significant
near-significant three-way
three-way interaction:
interaction: Inspection
Inspection of
of
was
means
showed
that
in
the
two
mildly
incongruous
conditions
means showed that in the two mildly incongruous conditions
(Khrushchev's letter
letter if
if either
either high
high affiliation
affiliation with
with no
no concessions
concessions
(Khrushchev's
or high
high power
power with
with concessions),
concessions), women
women had
had higher
higher average
average
or
endorsement of
of negotiation
negotiation choices
choices than
than did
did men,
men, F(
F (1,
l,
endorsement
109) =
= 3.71,
3.71, pp =
= .057.
.057. Perhaps
Perhaps in
in such
such situations
situations of
of mild
mild incon
incon
109)
gruity between
between cues
cues about
about the
the intentions
intentions of
of the
the other
other side,
side, women
women
gruity
8
8

The discussion
discussion of
of possible
possible method
method overlap
overlap between
between the
the concessions
concessions
The
and motive
motive imagery
imagery methods,
methods, in
in connection
connection with
with Study
Study I,1, applies
applies to
to
and
Study
Study 22 as
as well.
well.
9
Time of
of day
day was
was related
related to
to policy
policy choices,
choices, with
with afternoon
afternoon participants
participants
9 Time
making more
more aggressive
aggressive choices
choices than
than morning
morning participants.
participants. ItIt is
is not
not pos
pos
making
sible to
to determine
determine whether
whether this
this reflects
reflects aa true
true effect
effect of
of time
time or
or differences
differences
sible
among participants
participants who
who signed
signed up
up for
for different
different times.
times. Because
Because time
time of
of day
day
among
was not
not significantly
significantly related
related to
to either
either of
of the
the experimental
experimental conditions,
conditions, the
the
was
concessions or
or motive
motive scores
scores in
in participants'
participants' responses,
responses, or
or any
any other
other
concessions
demographic variable,
variable, this
this effect
effect was
was ignored
ignored in
in subsequent
subsequent analyses.
analyses.
demographic

Khrushchev
letter
version

Affiliation
(vs.
(vs. power)
motive imagery

Participants'
policy choices

Participants' response letter

.23"
.23**

Affiliation
motive
imagery

^ 2 .20*
0*

Positive
concessions

.18*

V.22*
-.22*

I

\ -.28"
-.28**
)
-.25*'
-.25**
i f

Average
endorsement of
negotiation
choices

\
-.24*

Explicit
concession
offered

Figure 1.
1.

Power
motive
imagery

.30"
.30**

Negative
concessions

2. *
*p <
< .05. **
** pp <
< .01.
.01.
Post hoc path analysis of variables from Study 2.

affiliation
tend to respond to whichever cue (explicit concession or affiliation
motive imagery) suggests de-escalation.
participants' re
re
Interrelationships of experimental conditions, participants'
sponses, and policy choices. As
As a way of drawing together the
the
different results of Study 2,
2, Figure I1 presents the
the results of a
different
all significant
significant relationships be
descriptive path analysis showing all
to the aver
tween experimental condition and response variables to
(i.e., the average endorse
age endorsement of negotiation choices (Le.,
ment of the three policy choices involving negotiation). The causal
ordering reflected
reflected in this figure assumes that the two experimental
conditions involving the Khrushchev letter precede the character
istics of the participants' response letter and that, within the letter,
motives precede concessions. These assumptions are
are certainly
debatable;
however,
the
intention
of
the
figure
is
to
give
coherent
debatable; however, the intention of the figure is to give aa coherent
overall description
description of
of our
our results
results rather
rather than
than to
to test
test aa single
single specific
specific
overall
causal model.
model. Obviously
Obviously this
this is
is aa post
hoc model
model that
that needs
needs further
further
causal
post hoc
testing in
in future
future replications.
replications. As
As suggested
suggested by
the figure,
figure, the
testing
by the
the
explicit concession-related
concession-related content
content of
of aa received
received communication
communication
explicit
directly affects
affects the
the tendency
tendency to
to offer
offer explicit
explicit concessions
concessions in
in re
re
directly
sponse. The
The motive
motive imagery
imagery of
of the
the received
received communication
communication di
sponse.
di
rectly affects
affects the
the motive
motive imagery
imagery of
of the
the response;
response; the
the response
response
rectly
motive imagery,
imagery, in
in turn,
turn, affects
affects explicit
explicit concessions
concessions offered
offered in
in the
the
motive
response.
This suggests,
suggests, as
as aa potential
general principle,
that the
potential general
principle, that
the
response. This
motive imagery
imagery of
of communications-involving
communications—involving affective
affective tone
tone
motive
more than
than explicit
explicit content-has
content—has effects
effects on
on concessions
concessions that
that are
are
more
indirect or
or mediated
mediated by
the arousal
arousal of
of motive
motive imagery
imagery of
indirect
by
the
of
10
responses.10
responses.
and the
the image of compromise. The
The se
se
Making concessions and
differential measures connotative meanings along three
mantic differential
dimensions of evaluation, potency, and
and activity. In
In Study 2,
2, the
the
major significant
significant results involved participants' evaluation and po
tency ratings of COMPROMISE and YOUR REPLY TO
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S

LETTER. As
As shown in
in Table 7,
7, participants
who made pOSItive
positive
LETTER.
partICIpants who
to view their own response as
as higher in
in eval
concessions tended to
and lower in
in potency, whereas participants who
who made
uation and
negative concessions showed the
the reverse pattern. Interestingly
enough, people's tendency to make concessions was not related to
to
the perceived potency of concession making itself. Gender was
was
to participants' images of compromise and
and their
their own
own re
re
related to
to view COMPROMISE
COMPROMISE as
as both better and
sponses. Women tended to
and
stronger while rating their own responses as
as weaker. (Recall that
women
made
more
positive
concessions
than
did men.)
men.)
women made more positive concessions than did
Summary of experimental results. The explicit offering
offering of a
or lack thereof
thereof by the
the Khrushchev letter had a recip
concession or
rocal effect
effect on
on whether participants offered
offered a positive concession
in response. The motive imagery in the Khrushchev letter also had
effect on
on motive imagery levels in
in participants' re
a reciprocal effect
re
The affiliation
affiliation version elicited higher affiliation
affiliation and
sponses: The
and
In other words, received
lower power than did the power version. In
concessions primed concessions offered
offered in
in response, and received
motive imagery primed response motive imagery. In
In this experi
ment, there were no
significant cross-primes; that is, concessions
no significant
or vice versa.
did not directly prime motive imagery, or
the archival
The motive imagery results of Study 2 replicate the
findings of the
the archival Study I1 reported previously. Making
positive concessions is
is positively related to
to affiliation
affiliation motivation
and negatively related to power motivation, whereas making neg
ative concessions shows the
the reverse pattern. The pattern of con

10
10

as used in this research, includes features of
The concept of motive, as
of
and situational arousability, as
as discussed by
dispositional stability and
by Winter

(1996, pp. 33-34).
33-34).

Table 7
Correlations of
of Concessions Measures With
Images of
of Concession
Correlation with
Negative
Positive
concessions concessions

Semantic differential variable
COMPROMIsE-evaluation
COMPROMISE—evaluation
COMPROMISE-potency
COMPROMISE—potency
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S
YOUR RESPONSE TO
LETTER—evaluation
LETTER-evaluation
YOUR RESPONSE TO
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S
LETTER-potency
LETTER—potency
0.
t pp<<. 1.10.

5.
* pp <<. 0.05.

** pP <

.01.

.09
.00

-.20*
-.02
-.02

.30***

-.17t
-.17t

-.20*

.23*

Female
gender
.20*
.20*
.34***

-.09
-.09
-.25**
-.25**

* * *p/ ><< . .001.
001.
***

cession making in participants' response letters was related to their
endorsement of policy choices involving negotiation.
One might wonder whether students' knowledge of how the
Cuban Missile Crisis actually ended (presuming that they actually
affect the
knew) could somehow bias their responses and thus affect
results. This is an unavoidable problem for experiments that use
actual crises rather than laboratory simulations (except on rare
Gulf Crisis was
occasions such as the fall of 1990, when the Gulf
ongoing and the ultimate result was unknown), but it is difficult
difficult to
effects of such knowledge. On the one hand, one
determine the effects
could argue that knowing the crisis ended peacefully
peacefully would make
participants
more reckless
reckless in
in their
their responses;
responses; on
on the
the other
other hand,
hand, the
the
participants more
fact
that
the
Cold
War
had
long
since
ended
might
make
them
fact that the Cold War had long since ended might make them
more conciliatory.
conciliatory. In
In any
any case,
case, however,
however, any
any general
general effect
effect for
for
more
participants
to imitate
imitate Kennedy's
Kennedy's decisions
decisions and
and actions
actions in
in 1962
1962
participants to
should tend
tend to
to wipe
wipe out,
out, rather
rather than
than create,
create, the
the effects
effects observed
observed
should
here. Finally,
Finally, as
as discussed
discussed above,
above, we
we found
found that
that students'
students' self
selfhere.
reported knowledge
knowledge of
of the
the crisis
crisis was
was unrelated
to any
any of
of their
their
unrelated to
reported
responses.
responses.
Discussion

Main Findings
Taken together, the results of these two studies extend our
knowledge of how conflicts may be resolved through compromise,
because they illuminate some important motivational and situa
tional dynamics of making (or rejecting) concessions. Both in
archival and laboratory settings, the affiliation
affiliation motive is associated
with positive concessions; power motivation, in contrast, predicts
offered by the other
negative concessions or rejecting concessions offered
side. In the laboratory study, the concession-related content of a
message elicited or primed concessions in response, and the mo
tivational tone of the message primed motive imagery in response.
offering conces
Response motive imagery, in turn, was related to offering
sions and
and to
to endorsing
endorsing policy
choices involving
involving negotiation.
negotiation. These
These
sions
policy choices
are important
important effects,
effects, because
because in
in both
both archival
archival and
and experimental
experimental
are
studies, concessions
concessions (and
(and their
their associated
associated motive
motive imagery)
imagery) have
have
studies,
been shown
shown to
to be
be related
related to
to policy
policy and
and ultimate
ultimate outcomes
outcomes of
of war
war
been
versus peace. Thus the present studies increase the precision of
of
terms such as cooperative and competitive negotiating orienta
tions, which have been used to describe individual state and trait
differences in negotiation style.
differences

These findings are consistent with previous studies of interna
&
tional negotiations relating concessions to rhetoric (Beriker &
1991; Druckman, 1986; Druckman &
& Harris, 1990;
Druckman, 1991;
Stoll &
& McAndrew,
MeAndrew, 1986) and demonstrating matching (or "tit
&
for-tat") effects
effects during the course of negotiation (Carnevale &
Pruitt, 1992).

System for
for Scoring Concessions
Taken together, the two studies provided both archival and
experimental validation for the system for scoring and measuring
concessions. Because the positive and negative concessions mea
sures showed the predicted relationship to crisis outcome (archival
study) and policy choices (experimental study), they can be seen as
reflecting critical elements of the compromise (or escalation)
process.

Psychological Model of
of the Concession-Compromise
Concession-Compromise
Process
Our results suggest some aspects of a general model of the
compromise process. The tendencies to make positive concessions,
and not to make negative concessions, seem to be critical deter
conflict will be peacefully
peacefully resolved or
minants of whether a conflict
offering con
escalate to war. The present research suggests that offering
cessions, in turn, is a function of three factors: (a) people's dispo
affil
sitional motive levels (i.e., their balance between power and affil
affiliation
iation motivation), (b) the balance of power and affiliation
motivation in messages they receive during the negotiation process
(which appear to act as motive-arousal experiences; see Winter,
1998), and
and (c)
(c) whether
whether explicit
explicit concessions
concessions are
are offered
offered to
to them
them in
1998),
in
messages they
they receive
receive during
during negotiation.
negotiation.
messages
Of course motives are only one of the psychological elements
that contribute to productive negotiations that can turn crises from
escalation to peaceful
peaceful resolution. Other variables, such as the
(reflected in
tendency to be hostile and punitive toward out-groups (reflected
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), cognitive
complexity, and the many individual and structural characteristics
reviewed at the beginning of this article also play important roles
in negotiation outcomes.

A Concluding Cautionary Note From History
successful negotiation and the
Concessions are often essential to successful
maintenance of peace; however, concessions and compromise may
effective or even morally "good." Thus,
not always be strategically effective
most historians regard the British concessions and compromises
Hitler—described
embodied in the 1938 Munich agreements with Hitler-described
by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as bringing "peace
. . . peace for our time" (1939, p. 200)-as
200)—as a cowardly
with honour ...
ineffective attempt to appease a brutal bully.
bully.I"I
and (ultimately) ineffective
There may be occasions where concessions (especially if they are
superficial ways) are
not reciprocated, or reciprocated only in superficial
II
" Some historians, however,
however, have suggested that by postponing an
inevitable war, the Munich agreements did give Britain more time to
rebuild its armed forces, though it is doubtful that this was Chamberlain's
intention in making them (see P. Kennedy, 1986).

neither virtuous nor prudent. Psychological analysis can only be an
aid to political wisdom, not a substitute for it.
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Appendix A
Government-to-Government
Government-to-Government Communications From Four Crises
Dale

5/22
5/23
5123
6/10
6/10

7/18
7/1R
7/1X~
7/20
7120
7/21
7121
7/28

7129
7/29
8/J
8/3

8/7
~17
8/11
8/21
9/9
9/13
9/13

9/19
9/19
9/19
9/20
'H20
9/20
9/20
9/20

9/23
9/23
9/23
9/24
9124

9/24
9/26
9126
9/26
9/26
9/26
9/26

9/26
9/'27
9/27
9/27
9/27

9/28

Document

Source

Munich crisis (1938)
Henderson letter to Ribbentrop
Henderson letter to Weizsacker
Henderson (Halifax) to Ribbentrop
Henderson to Weizsacker
Cadogan to Captain Wiedemann
Weizsacker to Henderson
Weizsacker to Halifax (message incorporated in document)
Halifax to Ribbentrop
Henderson to Weizsacker
Chamberlain to German ambassador
German ambassador to Chamberlain
Halifax to Hitler via Henderson
Ribbentrop to Halifax
Halifax to Ribbentrop
Chamberlain to Hitler
Chamberlain to Hitler
Weizsacker to Henderson
Henderson to Weizsacker
Chamberlain to Hitler (via Henderson)
Ribbentrop to Henderson
Henderson to Ribbentrop
Chamberlain
Hitler
Chamberlain lo
to Hitler
Hitler
to Chamberlain
Chamberlain
Hitler to
Chamberlain
Hitler
Chamberlain to
to Hiller
German
memorandum to
Chamberlain
German memorandum
to Chamberlain
Chamberlain
Hitler
Chamberlain to
to Hitler
Lord
Rothermere to
Ribbentrop
Lord Rothermere
to Ribbentrop
Ribbentrop
Rothermere
Ribbentrop to
to Lord
Lord Rothermere
Statement
Chamberlain
Statement by
by Chamberlain
Hitler
to Chamberlain
Chamberlain
Hitler to
Henderson
to Ribbentrop
Ribbentrop
Henderson to
Chamberlain
Hitler
Chamberlain to
to Hitler

GD II:: 320
320
GD II:: 331
331
411
GD II:: 411
GD II:: 490-491
490-491
BD I: 589-590
GD II:: 501-502
501-502
BD I: 609
BD II: 18-19
GD II: 525
BD II: 41
BD II: 60
BD II: 78-80
127~129
BD II: 127-129
BD II: 277-278
BDII:
BD
II: 314
BD II: 406
GD II: 839-840
GD II: 846-847
BD II:
BD
II: 424
BDII:
BD
II: 430-431
BD
II:
431-432
BD II: 431-*32
BD II:
BD
II: 482-^83
482-483
BD
II:
BD II: 485-487
BD II:
BD
II: 488
BD
BD II:
II: 495-496
BD
II:
BD II: 541-542
GD II:
GD
II: 939
GD
940-941
GD II:
II: 940--941
GD
II:
GD II: 943
BD
II:
BD II: 576-578
GD II:
GD
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Appendix B
B
Template Letter From Khrushchev to
to Kennedy, October 26, 1962
[Text as received by the U.S.
U.S. State Department from the U.S.S.R. Embassy]
Dear Mr. President:
By now we
we have already publicly exchanged our
our assessments of the
the
events around Cuba and each of us has set
his
set forth his explanation and his
understanding of these events. I think you will understand me
me correctly
if you
you are
are really
really concerned
concerned for
for the
the welfare
welfare of
of the
the world.
world. Everyone
Everyone
fAFF: if
[AFP:
capitalists, if they have not lost their reason.
reason, and.
and, all the
needs peace: both capitalists.
more, communists-people
communists—people who know how to
to value not
not only their own
more.
else, the lives of nations].
nationsl. We communists are against
lives but,
but. above all else.
[AFF: and have been defending the cause of
any wars between states at all lAFF:
of
peace ever since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as
calamity, not
not as
as aa game or
or aa means for
for achieving particular purposes.
purposes,
a calamity.
as aa goal in
in itself. Our
Our goals are
are clear, and
and the
the means of
much less as
of
is work. War is
is our enemy and aa calamity for all nations.
achieving them is
This is
people. and together with us.
as
is how we
we Soviet people,
us, other peoples as
well, interpret questions of war and peace. I can say this with assurance at
well.
at
countries, as well as for all progressive
least for the peoples of the Socialist countries.
people who want peace,
happiness, and friendship among nations.
peace. happiness.
can see,
see. Mr.
Mr. President.
President, that you
you also are
are not
not devoid of
of aa sense of
I can
of
world, not without an understanding and correct
anxiety for the fate of the world.
assessment of the nature of modern warfare and what war entails. What
you?1 [POW:
fPOW: You threaten us with war. But you well
good would a war do you?]
know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had
suffer the same consequences.]
consequences.1 [AFF:
FAFF: That must be
given us; you would suffer
be
to us-people
us—people invested with authority.
authority, trust, and responsibility. We
clear to
not succumb to
to light-headedness and
and petty passions,
must not
passions. regardless of
of
whether elections are forthcoming in one country or another. These are all
transitory things.]
things.l [POW:
fPOW: Should
Should war
war indeed
indeed break
out, it
it would
would not
not be
in
transitory
break out,
be in
our power
to contain
contain or
or stop
stop it.
it. for
forsuch
such isisthe
the logic
logic of
ofwar.
war. IIhave
have taken
taken
our
power to
part
in two
two wars.
wars, and
and II know
know that
that war
war only
only ends
ends when
when it
it has
has rolled
rolled through
through
part in
cities and
and villages.
villages, sowing
sowing death
death and
and destruction
destruction everywhere.
everywhere.
cities
You may regard us with distrust, but you can at any rate rest assured that we
offensive
are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we launch an offensive
you, you
you will respond in
in kind. But
But you
you too
too will get
get in
in response
against you.
us. And I think that you also understand that.
that, too.
whatever you throw at us.
This indicates that] we are sane people, [POW: that]
that! we understand and
assess the situation correctly. How could we, then, allow ourselves the wrong
you ascribe to
to us?
or suicides [POW:
fPOW: who
actions which you
us? Only lunatics or
who
to perish and to
to destroy the whole world before they die.]
die.l
themselves want to
do this.
this, [APP:
fAFF:But
But we
wewant
want totolive
liveand
andby
byno
nomeans
meansdo
do we
wewant
want to
to
could do
countrv.l We want something quite different: to compete with your
destroy our country.]
FAFF: in
in aa peaceful endeavor].
endeavor!. We argue with you; we have differdiffer
country [APP:
ences on ideological questions. But our concept of the world is that questions
as well as
as economic problems,
of ideology, as
problems. should be
be settled by other than
military means; they must be solved [APP:
fAFF: in
in peaceful contest, or, as
as this is
is
in capitalist society-]
society—1 by
fAFF: Our premise has
understood in
by competition. [APP:
has
been
and remains
remains that
that peaceful
coexistence of
of two
two different
different sociopolitical
sociopolitical
been and
peaceful coexistence
systems—a reality
reality of
of our
our world-is
world—is essential,
essential, and
and that
that it
it is
is essential
essential to
to ensure
ensure
systems-a
lasting peace.l
These are
are the
the principles
to which
which we
we adhere.
lasting
peace.] These
principles to
adhere.
[POW: You
You have
have now
now declared
declared piratical
piratical measures.
measures, the
thekind
kind that
that were
were
practiced in the Middle Ages when ships passing through international waters
Our
were attacked, and you have called this aa "quarantine" around Cuba. Our
vessels will probably soon enter the zone patrolled by your Navv.l
Navy.] I assure you
are now headed for
for Cuba are
are carrying the
the most
that these vessels which are
[AFF: peacefull
fPOW: Do you really think that all
all we
we
innocuous [APP:
peaceful] cargoes. [POW:
our time
time on
onisistransporting
transporting so-called
so-called offensive
offensive weapons.
weapons, atomic
atomic and
and
spend our
hydrogen bombs?!
bombs?] Even though your military people may possibly imagine
that these are some special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the most
ordinary [APP:
peaceful] goods.
[AFF: kind of peacefull

Therefore, Mr. President.
President, let us show good sense. I assure you that the ships
at all.
all. The armaments needed for
bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at
do not
not mean
mean to
to say
say that
that there
there have
have been
the defense of Cuba are already there. I do
at all.
all. No,
no shipments of armaments at
No. there were such shipments. But now
Cuba has already obtained the necessary weapons for defense.
[APP:
fAFF: II do
do not
not know
know whether
whether you
you can
can understand
understand me
me and
and believe
believe me.
me. But
But
to
I wish you would believe yourself and agree that one should not give way to
them.l [POW: If you begin
one's passions; that one should be
be master of them.]
it would be piracy,
yourself know. If we should start
stopping vessels it
piracy. as you yourself
doing this to your ships you would be just as indignant as we and the whole
world are now indignant. Such actions cannot be
be interpreted otherwise, be
bethisl [APP:
fAFF: Were such actions]
actionsl
cause lawlessness cannot be legalized. Were this]
allowed to
to happen
happen then
then there
there would
would be
no peace;
nor would
would there
there be
be peaceful
peaceful
allowed
be no
peace; nor
coexistence. [POW:
fPOW: Then
Then we
we would
would be
forced to
to put
to take
take the
the necessary
necessary
coexistence.
be forced
put to
measures of
of aa defensive
defensive nature
nature which
which would
would protect
protect our
our interests
interests in
in accordance
accordance
measures
with international
international law.
law. Why
Why do
do this?]
this?l What
What would
would all
all this
this lead
lead to?
to? [AFF:
fAFF: Let
with
Let
us
normalize relations.]
relations.l
us normalize

is not preparing an invasion.]
invasion.1
[POW: You said once that the United States is
fAFF: You have declared that you sympathized with the Cuban emigrants.]
emigrants.!
lAPP:
fPOW: But you have also declared that you will carry out plans against the
[POW:
present government of Cuba. Nor is itit any secret to anyone that the constant
threat of armed attack and aggression has hung and continues to
to hang over
Cuba.l It
It is only this that has prompted us to respond to [APP:
fAFF: the request of
Cuba.]
of
the Cuban
Cuban Government
Government to
to extend
extend itit our
our aid.]
aid.l [POW:
[POW: strengthen
strengthen the
the defense
defense
the
capability of
of that
that country.]
countrv.l
capability
Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. [CONCESSION: I PROPOSE:
WE, FOR OUR PART.
PART, WILL DECLARE
DECLARE THAT OUR SHIPS BOUND FOR
FOR CUBA
CUBA ARE
ARE NOT
NOT
CARRYING
CARRYING ANY ARMAMENTS.
ARMAMENTS. You
YOU WILL DECLARE
DECLARE THAT THE UNITED
UNITED STATES WILL
NOT INVADE CUBA
NOT SUPPORT
NOT
CUBA WITH ITS TROOPS AND WILL NOT
SUPPORT ANY OTHER FORCES
WHICH MIGHT INTEND TO
presence of
TO INVADE CUBA.] Then the necessity for the presence
of
military specialists
specialists in
in Cuba
Cuba will be
obviated.
our military
be obviated.
[poW:
to you to
to weigh
weigh carefully
carefully what
what the aggressive.
aggressive.
[POW: Mr. President,
President, I appeal to
piratical
which you have announced
announced the United
United States intends to
to cany
carry out
piratical actions which
in international
international waters would
would lead to. You
You yourself
yourself know
know that
that aa sensible
sensible person
person
simply cannot
cannot agree to
to this, cannot
cannot recognize
recognize your right to
to such action.
action.
simply
If
unleashing of war-well
as the
the first
first step towards
towards the
the unleashing
war—well
If you have done this as
then—evidently
nothing remains
remains for us to do but to accept
accept this challenge
challenge of
of yours.]
vours.l
thenevidently nothing
If you have not lost command
command of yourself
yourself and realize clearly
clearly what this could
could lead
If
then, Mr. President,
President, you and I should
should not now pull on
on the ends of the rope in
to, then.
in
which you have tied a knot of war.
war, because
harder you and I pull, the tighter
tighter
which
because the harder
this knot will become. And
And a time may
may come
come when
when this knot is tied so tight that the
person
longer capable
capable of untying
untying it [poW:
fPOW: and then the knot will
person who tied it is no longer
have to
to be
cut. What
What that
that would
would mean
mean II need
need not
not explain
explain to
to you,
you, because
have
be cut.
because you
you
yourself understand
understand perfectly
what dread
dread forces
forces our
our two
two countries
countries possess.]
possess.l
yourself
perfectly what
sincere desire
desire to
toalleviate
alleviate the
thesituation
situation
fAFF: These
These thoughts
thoughts are governed
governed by
[APP:
by aa sincere
and remove
remove the threat of war.]
war.l
Respectfully,
Respectfully.
N. Khrushchev
Khrushchev
Note. This version
Khrushchev's letter
letter is
is a 1.292-word
1,292-word abridgement.
abridgement,
Note.
version of Khrushchev's
slightly modified,
modified, from
from the
the longer
longer original
original text of the
the "informal"
"informal" translation
translation
slightly
published in
power and
published
in U.S. Department
Department of State (1973). Sentences
Sentences containing
containing power
affiliation
bracketed. underlined,
by the
the
affiliation motive
motive images.
images, here bracketed,
underlined, and
and identified
identified by
labels POW
POW or AFF, were included
included in
in the
the respective
respective motive
motive imagery
imagery condicondi
tions. The
The sentences
sentences containing
containing Khrushchev's
Khrushchev's explicit
explicit concession,
concession, here brackbrack
eted, printed
printed in
in small
small capitals.
capitals, and
and identified
identified with the
the label CONCESSION.
CONCESSION,
eted.
were removed
removed in
in the
the "no
"no concession"
concession" conditions.
conditions.

